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I. INTRODUCTION – THE BAGOT  SCENARIO 
Your adult son, though employed, is mentally handicapped.  
Ordinarily, you drive him to and from work, but over the next 
several weeks you will be out of town for a number of days.  You 
decide to have a particular taxicab company fill in for you, and you 
make the necessary arrangements through a telephone call to the 
company’s dispatcher. 
You believe the cab company employs cab drivers as well as 
dispatchers, and your belief comes from the company’s trade 
name, trade dress, advertisements, signage, and published 
 
 †  Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, A.B. Harvard 
University, 1972; J.D. Yale School of Law, 1979.  Professor Kleinberger appreciates, 
as always, the guidance, insights and support of Carolyn C. Sachs, Esq. 
 ††  Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, J.D. Harvard Law 
School, 1983. 
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telephone numbers.  This appearance plays a role in your decision 
to have this particular company dispatch drivers to transport your 
son. 
In due course, you leave town and the cab company dispatches 
cabs to transport your son.  Unfortunately, one of these cabs is 
involved in an accident, the driver is at fault and your son is 
injured.  Only when you seek compensation from the taxicab 
company for your son’s injuries do you discover that the company 
does not in fact employ the drivers.  Contrary to appearances, the 
drivers in those distinctively marked cabs are all independent 
contractors.  The taxicab company denies any legal responsibility 
for the driver’s negligence and for your son’s injuries. 
Addressing precisely this scenario, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals concluded that the plaintiff could not proceed against the 
taxicab company.1  In Bagot v. Airport & Airline Taxi Cab Corp., the 
court concluded that (1) the cab driver was an independent 
contractor; (2) the taxicab company did not owe a non-delegable 
duty of care to the plaintiff; and (3) Minnesota does not recognize, 
through apparent authority, ostensible agency, or any other legal 
doctrine, any basis for plaintiff’s claim against the defendant cab 
company.2  One judge dissented,3 and the Minnesota Supreme 
Court granted the plaintiff’s petition for further review.4  The 
parties subsequently settled the case,5 and the Supreme Court then 
dismissed the appeal.6 
 
 1. Bagot v. Airport & Airline Taxi Cab Corp., No. C1-00-1291, 2001 WL 
69489, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).  The trial court granted summary judgment 
for the defendant taxicab company, and the plaintiff appealed.  The introductory 
scenario is based on the facts accepted as true by the district court for the purpose 
of the summary judgment motion.  Although the appellant “argue[d] that the 
district court made inappropriate findings of fact,” the court of appeals ruled that 
“[t]he facts presented to the district court were not disputed by the parties.”  Id. 
 2. Id. at *3-*5. 
 3. Id. at *6 (Klaphake, J., dissenting). 
 4. Bagot v. Airport & Airline Taxi Cab Corp., No. C1-00-1291, 2001 WL 
69489, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), petition for review granted, (Minn. March 27, 
2001).  The Supreme Court then took the unusual step of soliciting amicus briefs 
from the three law schools then operating in Minnesota, and the authors of this 
article filed a brief urging reversal of the Minnesota Court of Appeals decision. 
 5. Letter from Charles T. Hvass, Jr., counsel for Petitioner/Appellant, to 
Daniel S. Kleinberger and Peter B. Knapp (May 11, 2001) (on file with the William 
Mitchell Law Review). 
 6. Bagot v. Airport & Airline Taxi Cab Corp., No. C1-00-1291, 2001 WL 
69489, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), dismissed, (Minn. May 15, 2001). 
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF BAGOT 
The issues raised by Bagot transcend both the case itself and 
the taxicab situation.  In our modern economy, more and more 
service businesses present themselves to the marketplace as 
economically integrated enterprises while using independent 
contractors rather than traditional employees to provide the actual 
service.7  Consider, for example, a scenario from the world of 
health care. 
A parent is considering whether to take a seriously ill child to a 
free standing urgent care clinic or to the Emergency Room of the 
region’s leading children’s hospital.  The parent thinks, “The ER 
staff is part of the hospital.  They must be top notch.”  That 
thought helps the parent decide to entrust the child to the ER.  
Unbeknownst to the parent, however, the hospital has “subbed out” 
the ER function to a group of independent contractors.  Nothing 
in the hospital’s publicity, advertising or signage has disclosed this 
fact.  If the ER staff treats the child negligently, is the hospital 
unaccountable as a matter of law for the appearance it created and 
the role that appearance played in the parent’s decision to bring 
the child to the ER?8 
 Whatever the type of business, the actual relationship among 
the parties is likely to fall within one of the following three 
structures: 
 
 7. The phenomenon has caused problems in other contexts.  See, e.g., 
Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that 
ERISA benefits were available to workers whom the defendant claimed were 
independent contractors), appeal after remand sub nom. Vizcaino v. United States 
Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Wash., 173 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 1999), op. amended on 
denial of reh’g sub nom In re Vizcaino, 184 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 1105, (2000).  The phenomenon also occurs with businesses selling goods, 
but that context is beyond the scope of this article.  In such a context, liability 
typically arises from breach of contract rather than negligence.  Where liability 
sounds in negligence, the doctrines of respondeat superior and apparent servant 
(discussed here) are central to the liability analysis.  Those doctrines are 
inapposite to breach of contract claims. 
 8. See, e.g., Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1380 (Alaska 1987) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1957)); Clark v. Southview Hosp. & 
Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46 (Ohio 1994). 
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Structure 1.  Direct Service Provider is acting as servant employee 
of Apparently Integrated Business: 
 
Customer                     Direct Service               Apparently Integrated 
                                     Provider                        Business 
Parent in Bagot            Cab Driver                    Taxicab Company 
Parent of ER Child     ER Staff                         Hospital 
 
Structure 2.  Direct Service Provider is acting in non-servant 
relationship (independent contractor) with Apparently Integrated 
Business: 
Customer                     Direct Service               Apparently Integrated 
                                     Provider                        Business 
Parent in Bagot            Cab Driver                    Taxicab Company 
Parent of ER Child     ER Staff                         Hospital 
 
Structure 3.  Apparently Integrated Business is serving as a mere 
intermediary to arrange a relationship between Customer and 
Direct Service Provider: 
Customer                     Apparently                    Direct Service 
                                     Integrated Business      Provider 
Parent in Bagot            Taxicab Company        Cab Driver9 
 
Which structure fits a particular situation is both a question of 
fact10 and a crucial legal characterization.  Where Structure #1 
applies, the Apparently Integrated Business is the “master” of the 
Direct Service Provider and under the doctrine of respondeat superior 
is automatically and inescapably liable for any negligence of the 
Direct Service Provider which occurs “within the scope of 
employment.”11  Where Structure #2 applies, respondeat superior has 
 
 9. Although arguably the situation in Bagot, this structure does not plausibly 
fit the ER scenario. 
 10. See, e.g., A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 290 
(Minn. 1981) (stating that in a case determining whether an agent for an 
undisclosed principal, such relationship may be shown by circumstantial 
evidence); North Face Exteriors v. Comm’r of Jobs & Training, 457 N.W.2d 778, 
780 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (“Cases distinguishing between employees and 
independent contractors are often factually close.”); Hagen v. Burmeister & 
Assoc., Inc., No. CT-95-3634, 1999 WL 31130, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1999) 
(stating that a factual determination is an essential element on retrial in 
determining apparent authority). 
 11. Schneider v. Buckman, 433 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Minn. 1988); RESTATEMENT 
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no role and the Apparently Integrated Business will be liable to the 
Customer only if the Business has itself breached some duty.12  
Where Structure #3 applies, respondeat superior is again inapplicable 
and liability vel non for the Apparently Integrated Business again 
turns on whether the Business owes and has breached a direct duty 
to the Customer.  If the Customer was unaware that the Business 
was serving as a mere intermediary, the Business will have the 
liabilities applicable to an agent of an undisclosed principal.13 
The dismissal of the Bagot appeal resurrected the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals decision, which, though unreported, is still quite 
dangerous.  Although unreported decisions lack precedential 
value,14 they can be influential.15  The potential for influence is 
especially strong when the court announces that it can find no 
Minnesota precedent to support an important principle of law.  
The majority in Bagot made just such an announcement, rejecting 
as without precedential foundation the appellant’s effort to hold 
the taxicab company accountable for the appearances the company 
had purposefully created.16 
 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957 Main Vol.).  See generally DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, 
AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS § 3.2, at 82–95 (1995) 
[hereinafter KLEINBERGER, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP].  “Scope of employment” can 
itself be a thorny issue, especially in cases of intentional torts.  See, e.g., Hagen v. 
Burmeister & Assoc., Inc., 633 N.W.2d 497, 504 (Minn. 2001) (“The general 
policy, then, is that we will not impose such liability unless there is some 
connection between the tort and the business such that the employer in essence 
assumed the risk when it chose to engage in the business.”); see also KLEINBERGER, 
AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP, §§ 3.2.5 & 3.2.6, at 88–95.  In cases like Bagot, however, 
scope of employment is typically clear.  That is, if the cab driver had been indeed 
the servant of the cab company, driving a customer would have been indisputably 
within the scope of employment. 
 12. See KLEINBERGER, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP, supra note 11, § 3.3.1, at 96 
(explaining that if principal owes a direct duty of care to a third party, an agent’s 
negligence may result in the principal’s breaching that duty of care); § 4.4.1, at 
145-147 (explaining principal’s duty to properly select and use agents); § 4.4.2, at 
147-148 (non-delegable duties imposed by other law); § 4.4.3, at 148 (duties 
assumed by contract). 
 13. See discussion infra Part VII. 
 14. Minn. Stat. § 480A.08 subd. 3 (2001). 
 15. See Daniel S. Kleinberger, Guilty Knowledge, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 953, 
954 (1996) (stating that “unpublished opinions . . . routinely influence both 
lawyers and judges” and noting that “the Minnesota Court of Appeals sometimes 
cites its own unpublished decisions, and even the Minnesota Supreme Court 
occasionally discusses unreported cases”) (footnotes omitted). 
 16. Bagot v. Airport & Airline Taxi Cab Corp., No. C1-00-1291, 2001 WL 
69489, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
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III. PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE 
This article takes fundamental issue with Bagot and seeks to 
demonstrate that: 
(i) the agency law doctrine of apparent authority provides the 
proper framework for understanding Bagot-type situations; and 
(ii) Minnesota has well-established principles of apparent 
authority that support applying that doctrine to such situations. 
This article also presents an alternate theory of agency law for 
resolving Bagot itself – namely, the liability of an agent for the 
contract duties of a partially disclosed or undisclosed principal. 
IV. APPARENT AUTHORITY AS THE ANALYTIC CRUX 
The parties in Bagot jousted as to whether the cab driver was an 
independent contractor, whether the taxicab company owed the 
passenger a non-delegable duty of care and whether the cab driver 
and the cab company were a joint enterprise.17  As to the latter two 
issues, the court’s focus was misplaced.  Once it sustained the trial 
court’s finding that the cab driver was an independent contractor,18 
the court should have decided the appeal according to the doctrine 
of apparent authority.19 
Apparent authority is a principle of agency law which attaches 
consequences to the appearances created by a person’s conduct.  
When an “apparent principal” makes “manifestations” to a third 
person so that the third person believes the “apparent agent” is 
actually acting on the apparent principal’s behalf, the apparent 
agent has “the power . . . to affect the legal relations of [the] 
apparent principal with respect to [the] third person.”20 
Apparent authority is a fundamental part of the common law 
of agency21 and has an undeniable pedigree in the common law of 
 
 17. Id. at *1-*5. 
 18. Id. at *2-*3. 
 19. As discussed in Part I, infra, the court did consider Restatement (Second) 
of Agency, section 267 and Restatement (Second) of Torts section 429, but 
summarily rejected both sections as without precedent in Minnesota law. 
 20. Sauber v. Northland Ins. Co., 87 N.W.2d 591, 598 (Minn. 1958) 
(“Apparent authority is the power of an apparent agent to affect the legal relations 
of an apparent principal with respect to a third person by acts done in accordance 
with such principal’s manifestations of consent to such third person that such 
agent shall act as his agent.”). 
 21. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP, supra note 11, § 2.1.2, at 17 
(stating apparent authority is one of five major theories for determining a person’s 
06_KLEINBERGER 4/18/2002  5:03 PM 
2002] “APPARENT SERVANTS” 1533 
 
Minnesota.22  The doctrine’s modern foundation is the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, section 8,23 which has been 
repeatedly cited and used by both the Minnesota Supreme Court 
and the Minnesota Court of Appeals.24 
When the apparent principal creates the appearance of an 
employer-employee relationship, the applicable concept is that of 
“apparent servant.”25  In the Restatement (Second) of Agency, this 
aspect of apparent authority appears in section 267: 
One who represents that another is his servant or other 
agent and thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely 
upon the care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to 
liability to the third person for harm caused by the lack of 
care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant or other 
agent as if he were such.26 
Section 267 suffices to give plaintiffs like Bagot a cause of 
action,27 but the Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected section 267 as 
unprecedented in Minnesota: “[A]ppellant supplies no authority 
for the application of section 267 to Minnesota theories of recovery 
 
power to create legal obligations for another person). 
 22. E.g., Truck Crane Serv. Co. v. Barr-Nelson, Inc., 329 N.W.2d 824, 827 
(Minn. 1983); McGee v. Breezy Point Estates, 166 N.W.2d 81, 87-89 (Minn. 1969); 
Hockemeyer v. Pooler, 130 N.W.2d 367, 375 (Minn. 1964); Sauber v. Northland 
Ins. Co., 87 N.W.2d 591, 597-98 (Minn. 1958); Am. Parkinson Disease Ass’n v. First 
Nat’l Bank of Northfield, 584 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
 23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1957).  “Apparent authority is the 
power to affect the legal relations of another person by transactions with third 
persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising from and in accordance with 
the other’s manifestations to such third persons.”  Id. 
 24. E.g., Associated Lithographers v. Stay Wood Prods., Inc., 279 N.W.2d 787, 
790 (Minn. 1979); Duluth Herald and News Tribune v. Plymouth Optical Co., 176 
N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 1970); Lindstrom v. Minn. Liquid Fertilizer Co., 119 
N.W.2d 855, 861-62 (Minn. 1963); Sauber v. Northland Ins. Co., 87 N.W.2d 591, 
598 (Minn. 1958); Lyman Lumber Co. v. Three Rivers Co., 400 N.W.2d 811, 813 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
 25. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP, supra note 11, § 3.3.4 at 98. 
 26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1957).  See infra note 35 and 
accompanying text for the tort law formulation of the rule. 
 27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267. 
P, a taxicab company, purporting to be the master of the drivers of the 
cabs, in fact enters into an arrangement with the drivers by which the 
drivers operate independently. A driver negligently injures T, a 
passenger, and also B, a person upon the street. P is not liable to B. If it is 
found that T relied upon P as one furnishing safe drivers, P is subject to 
liability to T in an action of tort. 
Id. § 267 cmt. a, illus. 1. 
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and we have found none.”28 
The research was deficient.  The principles underlying section 
267 have been part of Minnesota law since 191429, when the 
Minnesota Supreme Court decided Jewison v. Dieudonne.30  In that 
decision the court stated: 
Where there is a holding out of a . . . relation concerning 
the control of a place where business is transacted and an 
invitation extended, under such circumstances of 
publicity as to warrant the inference that a person 
subsequently injured therein through the negligence of 
an employee of those in charge must have had the right to 
believe that those extending the invitation were in control 
of the premises, a recovery may be had without regard to 
the actual existence of the . . . relation.31 
Jewison concerned the appearance of a partnership relation, but 
the same principle applies when the appearance is that of master 
and servant.  In 1939, the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly 
connected Jewison and section 267, citing section 267 as an 
established exception to “the ordinary personal injury case [in 
which] the injured person does not rely upon authority of any kind 
in getting hurt” and describing Jewison as involving liability from 
“the continued use of defendant’s name in conduct of the 
business.32 
Thus, to invoke section 267 for cases such as Bagot is to apply 
rather than to create precedent.  Moreover, section 267 does not 
stand alone within Minnesota’s common law.  Section 267 is merely 
a particular application of the fundamental principle stated in 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, section 8.33  Indeed, section 8 
contains an example that could have been derived from 
 
 28. Bagot v. Airport & Airline Taxi Cab Corp., No. C1-00-1291, 2001 WL 
69489, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 29. Considering the plaintiff’s claim under section 267, the majority in Bagot 
wrote, “appellant supplies no authority for the application of section 267 to 
Minnesota theories of recovery and we have found none.  We decline to extend 
Minnesota law by applying section 267 as requested by appellant.”  Id. at *5. 
 30. Jewison v. Dieudonne, 149 N.W. 20 (Minn. 1914). 
 31. Id. at 20. 
 32. Schlick v. Berg , 286 N.W. 356, 358 (Minn. 1939) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 267). 
 33. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP, supra note 11, § 3.3.4 at 98 
(characterizing section 267 as an area where the doctrine of respondeat superior 
meshes with the law of apparent authority).  As for the prominence in Minnesota 
case law of Restatement (Second) of Agency section 8, see supra note 24. 
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Appellant’s view of the facts of Bagot: 
The Ace Taxi Company employs no drivers but merely 
receives orders from prospective passengers and puts “Ace 
Taxi Company” on cabs owned and operated by 
independent drivers.  One of these drivers collides 
negligently with another automobile, damaging one of his 
passengers who reasonably believed the Taxi Company to 
be the employer.  The Taxi Company is liable to the 
passenger but not to the owner of the other vehicle.34 
V. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS SECTION 429 
In Bagot, the Court of Appeals also considered whether 
plaintiffs could proceed against the taxicab company under section 
429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  That section states: 
One who employs an independent contractor to perform 
services for another which are accepted in the reasonable 
belief that the services are being rendered by the 
employer or by his servants, is subject to liability for 
physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor 
in supplying such services, to the same extent as though 
the employer were supplying them himself or by his 
servants.35 
The section 429 theory met the same fate as the section 267 
theory: “Minnesota has not explicitly or implicitly adopted section 
429.  Plaintiff has failed to articulate a case to extend current 
Minnesota law, and as such, the [c]ourt finds that section 429 of 
the Restatement of Torts is inapplicable.”36 
Although on this point the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
correctly characterized Minnesota precedent, the absence of 
precedent is immaterial.  Section 429 is merely tort law’s analog to 
section 267 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency. 
Section 429’s wording does differ somewhat from the wording 
of section 267, but the difference disappears when the sections are 
applied.  Section 267 makes apparent agency the product of 
affirmative manifestation by the apparent employer, imposing 
 
 34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 cmt. e, illus. 11. (1957). 
 35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965). 
 36. Bagot v. Airport & Airline Taxi Cab Corp., No. C1-00-1291, 2001 WL 
69489, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
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liability on “[o]ne who represents that another is his servant,”37 
while section 429 looks to the service recipient’s state of mind, 
imposing liability when that person accepts those services “in the 
reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by the 
employer or by his servants . . . .”38 
However, courts applying section 429 routinely insist that the 
plaintiff demonstrate that the “ostensible principal” took some 
action to create the plaintiff’s “reasonable belief.”  For example, in 
Osborne v. Adams,39 the court considered the liability of a hospital 
for the actions of doctors, who were independent contractors 
working in the hospital’s neonatology unit.40  Having cited section 
429 as the basis for a claim of apparent authority or ostensible 
agency, the court then examined each element of a three-part test 
of liability.41  The third element considered whether the plaintiff 
had a reasonable belief that the services received were provided by 
the hospital.42  The first element, however, was characterized by the 
court as “holding out.”43  Under this element the court performed a 
section 267 type inquiry and examined the hospital’s marketing 
efforts and other representations which gave rise to the plaintiff’s 
belief that the services received were provided by the hospital.44  
The second element of the test was whether the plaintiff looked to 
the hospital, rather than the individual physician to provide 
services.45 
In essence, Osborne infused a section 267 concept into a section 
429 case.  In general, cases applying sections 267 and 429 yield 
essentially indistinguishable rules and results.  Indeed, one Texas 
decision inadvertently reflected this jurisprudential amalgam by 
citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 267.46 
The amalgam is more purposefully reflected in a recent 
Indiana Supreme Court opinion, decided in the health care 
 
 37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267. 
 38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429. 
 39. 550 S.E.2d 319 (S.C. 2001). 
 40. Id. at 319. 
 41. Id. at 321-22. 
 42. Id. at 322. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 322. 
 45. Id. at 322; see also Simmons v. Tuomey Reg’l Med. Ctr., 533 S.E.2d 312, 
322 (S.C. 2000). 
 46. Valdez v. Pasadena Healthcare Mgmt., Inc., 975 S.W.2d 43, 47 n.2 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1998). 
06_KLEINBERGER 4/18/2002  5:03 PM 
2002] “APPARENT SERVANTS” 1537 
 
context: 
Courts that have held hospitals liable for the negligence 
of independent contractor physicians under apparent 
agency have sometimes referred to or adopted [s]ection 
267, [s]ection 429, or both, and sometimes have not 
referred to or adopted either [s]ection 267 or [s]ection 
429.  While the language employed by these courts 
sometimes varies, generally they have employed tests 
which focus primarily on two basic factors.  The first factor 
focuses on the hospital’s manifestations and is sometimes 
described as an inquiry whether the hospital “acted in a 
manner which would lead a reasonable person to 
conclude that the individual who was alleged to be 
negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital.”  
Courts considering this factor often ask whether the 
hospital “held itself out” to the public as a provider of 
hospital care, for example, by mounting extensive 
advertising campaigns.  In this regard, the hospital need 
not make express representations to the patient that the 
treating physician is an employee of the hospital; rather a 
representation also may be general and implied.  The 
second factor focuses on the patient’s reliance.  It is 
sometimes characterized as an inquiry as to whether “the 
plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the 
hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and 
prudence.”47 
In sum, the lack of Minnesota precedent for section 429 is 
immaterial to cases like Bagot.  The principles of section 267 
parallel the principles of section 429, and section 267 is amply 
supported by Minnesota precedent. 
VI. APPARENT AUTHORITY AS GOOD POLICY 
Applying the doctrine of apparent authority in Bagot-type 
circumstances is more than merely consistent with precedent.  The 
apparent servant concept allows Minnesota’s common law to 
respond appropriately to changing economic realities and is 
therefore good policy. 
The resilience of the common law comes, in part, from 
applying established principles to changing circumstances.  In our 
 
 47. Sword v. NKC Hosp., Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142, 150-51 (Ind. 1999) (citations 
omitted). 
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modern economy, more and more businesses present themselves to 
the marketplace as economically integrated enterprises while 
substituting independent contractors for traditional employees.  
The common law makes no objection to this development, which is 
said to increase economic efficiency.48  The common law does, 
however, apply its doctrine of apparent authority to link economic 
efficiency with social responsibility. 
That link is proper and has implications far beyond claims of 
passengers against taxicab companies.  Consider, for example, the 
hospital emergency room scenario presented at the beginning of 
this article.49  That scenario reflects an increasingly common 
arrangement in modern health care. 
For example, in Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center,50 the court 
considered whether an HMO was liable for the alleged negligence 
of independent contractor physicians.  Citing comment (a) of 
section 267, the court stated: 
In our opinion, because appellant’s decedent was 
required to follow the mandates of HMO and did not 
directly seek the attention of the specialist, there is an 
inference that appellant looked to the institution for care 
and not solely to the physicians; conversely, that 
appellant’s decedent submitted herself to the care of the 
participating physicians in response to an invitation from 
HMO.51 
Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc.,52 involved a similar 
situation.  The court used a reliance test that, though not expressly 
tied to section 267, was identical: Could the plaintiff demonstrate 
“justifiable reliance?”53  The defendant HMO argued that the 
plaintiff could not establish justifiable reliance because she did not 
choose the HMO.54  The court ruled that “where a person has no 
choice but to enroll with a single HMO and does not rely upon a 
 
 48. Walter Kiechel, How We Will Work in the Year 2000, FORTUNE, May 17, 
1993, at 38; see Bradford D. Duea, The Employee/Independent Contractor 
Classification: Do Loan Officers Working with California Mortgage Brokers 
Qualify as Statutory Independent Contractors?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 895, 901-02 
(1995). 
 49. See supra Part II. 
 50. 547 A.2d 1229, 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). 
 51. Id. at 1235. 
 52. 719 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. 1999). 
 53. Id. at 768-69. 
 54. Id. at 769. 
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specific physician, then that person is likewise relying upon the 
HMO to provide health care.”55 
Holding “apparent principals” responsible for the appearances 
they create is neither radical56 nor burdensome.  To avoid the rule’s 
impact, a business need only avoid creating misunderstanding in 
the minds of its customers.  In the Bagot case, for example, the 
following words would suffice, if voiced consistently by the 
company’s employee dispatchers as well as by the independent 
contractor drivers: “Taxicab company is just a dispatch service.  The 
cabs dispatched are independently owned and operated.”57 
VII. THE LAW OF PARTIALLY DISCLOSED AND UNDISCLOSED 
PRINCIPALS AS AN ALTERNATE SOLUTION TO THE TAXICAB 
SCENARIO 
The taxicab company in Bagot characterized itself as acting as 
an intermediary between customers and drivers by charging a fee to 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., Rhone v. Try Me Cab Co., 65 F.2d 834, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1933) 
(holding that a taxi passenger injured by negligence of the cab driver could 
recover from the independent registered owner of cab and from the non-profit 
corporation who advertised the cab as its own and citing a preliminary version of 
what became section 267 of the first Restatement of Agency); Middleton v. 
Frances, 77 S.W.2d 425, 426 (Ky. 1934) (holding taxicab company liable for 
independent cab owner negligence because owner permitted “to cruise” 
displaying taxicab company’s name). 
 57. In Petrovich, the defendant HMO relied upon a disclaimer contained in its 
subscriber certificate, which stated that the HMO physicians were independent 
contractors.  Petrovich, 719 N.E.2d at 767.  The court held that the HMO was not 
entitled to summary judgment of the apparent agency claim on the basis of this 
disclaimer alone.  Id.  First, there was a factual issue as to whether the plaintiff had 
received this information.  Id. at 763, 767.  Second, in light of evidence that the 
HMO held itself out as the provider of health care, the court ruled that the trier of 
fact “must therefore be permitted to weigh the conflicting evidence and decide 
this issue based on the totality of the circumstances.  Only a trier of fact can 
properly determine whether plaintiff had notice of the physicians’ status as 
independent contractors, or was put on notice by the circumstances.”  Id. at 767. 
One of the more recent cases touching on the efficacy of language disclaiming 
apparent authority involves a claim brought against the provider of a for-profit 
legal services plan.  In Gonzalzles v. American Express Credit Corp., 733 N.E.2d 
345 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000), the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s claims 
sounding in apparent authority in part because of the existence of disclaiming 
language in a handbook provided to plaintiff.  Id. at 353.  That language stated 
that the participating attorneys in the plan were independent contractors and not 
employees of the plan.  Id. 
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the drivers for arranging contracts of transport.58  The Minnesota 
Court of Appeals accepted that characterization.59  In such 
situations, agency law provides a separate basis for holding the 
taxicab company accountable for the actions of the cab drivers it 
dispatches: the liability of an agent for a contract made for an 
undisclosed or partially disclosed principal. 
Restatement (second) of Agency section 322 provides: “An 
agent purporting to act upon his own account, but in fact making a 
contract on account of an undisclosed principal, is a party to the 
contract.”  Restatement (Second) of Agency section 321 similarly 
provides: “Unless otherwise agreed, a person purporting to make a 
contract with another for a partially disclosed principal is a party to 
the contract.” 
Given the facts assumed by the trial court for the purposes of 
summary judgment,60 a contract may well have been predestined 
when Mr. Bagot, Sr. telephoned the taxicab company to arrange 
rides for his son.61  If, as the taxicab company contended, “[a]ny 
contract, i.e., payment of a fare in exchange for transportation to a 
location, was between the driver and the passenger,”62 then, when 
the taxicab company accepted Mr. Bagot Sr.’s call and later 
dispatched cabs, the company was acting either as: 
1.  a partially disclosed principal,63 if Mr. Bagot Sr. realized that 
the taxicab company was merely an intermediary acting for an 
 
 58. See, e.g., Airport’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Its Summary Judgment 
Motion at 1, Petition for Review, App. at 93, Bagot v. Airport & Airline Taxi Cab 
Corp., No. C1-00-1291, 2001 WL 69489, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that 
Airport provided insurance and dispatching to Ronald Brake in exchange for his 
weekly payment). 
 59. Bagot, 2001 WL 69489, at *2 (“Brake entered into an oral agreement with 
Airport Taxi requiring Brake to pay $230 per week in exchange for dispatch 
service and insurance under Airport’s commercial insurance policy as an 
‘additional insured.’”). 
 60. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 61. The corporation’s own view at least does not contradict this construction.  
See, e.g., Airport’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Its Summary Judgment Motion at 
3, Petition for Review, App. at 95, Bagot, 2001 WL 69489 (stating that “[a]ny 
contract, i.e., payment of a fare in exchange for transportation to a location, was 
between the driver and the passenger and not specifying the moment at which 
that contract formed”) (copy on file with the authors). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 4(2) (1957).  “If the other party 
has notice that the agent is or may be acting for a principal but has no notice of 
the principal’s identity, the principal for whom the agent is acting is a partially 
disclosed principal.”  Id. 
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unspecified number of cabs “in the available mix of cabs;”64 or 
2.  an undisclosed principal, 65 if — as seems more likely — Mr. 
Bagot Sr. believed that he was making an agreement with the 
taxicab company itself. 
In either case, the taxicab company would be liable on the 
contract with the taxi driver.  To the extent the driver owed a 
contractual obligation of safe driving to the customer, the taxicab 
company would be liable for any breach of that contract.66 
Both the rule and its rationale are simple.  An agent for a 
partially disclosed or undisclosed principal is liable on the 
principal’s contract with a third party.  The third party is entitled to 
hold accountable to the contract the only person whose identity 
the third party knows at the time the contract is formed.  
Minnesota law has recognized this principle for over 100 years,67 
and modern decisions show that the principle remains good law.68 
 
 64. Airport’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to It’s Summary Judgment Motion, 
Affidavit of Craig Allen Den Hartog at 7, Petition for Review, App. at 100, Bagot, 
2001 WL 69489 (Copy on file with authors). 
 65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 4(3) “If the other party has no notice 
that the agent is acting for a principal, the one for whom he acts is an undisclosed 
principal.”  Id. 
 66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 321, 322.  The Minnesota Court of 
Appeals did not consider, and it is beyond the scope of this article to address, 
whether the taxicab driver owed his passenger a contractual duty of safe driving in 
addition to the tort law duty to avoid negligence.  There is at least some support 
for finding such a contractual duty.  See, e.g., Gradin v. St. Paul & D.R. Co., 30 
Minn. 217, 219 14 N.W. 881, 882 (1883) (“Undoubtedly, in the ordinary carriage 
of passengers, there is a contract express or implied, involving the obligation as a 
matter of contract to carry safely and any negligence causing injury to the 
passenger is a breach of the contract and gives a right of action upon it.”); 10 AM 
JUR 24, CARRIERS § 949. 
 67. Kerr v. Simons, 207 N.W. 305, 307 (Minn. 1926) (“One acting for an 
undisclosed principal binds himself.”); Gay v. Kelley, 123 N.W. 295, 295 (Minn. 
1909) (“Where one party to a contract deals with another as principal, and 
afterwards discovers that such party was in fact an agent for an undisclosed 
principal, he may enforce the contract against such agent . . . .”), overruled on other 
grounds by Englestad v. Cargill, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 284, 285 (Minn. 1983); Amans v. 
Campbell, 73 N.W. 506, 507 (Minn. 1897) (“[A] person acting as agent for 
another will be personally responsible if, at the time of making the contract in his 
principal’s behalf, he fails to disclose the fact of his agency; that by reason of such 
failure he becomes subject to all the liabilities, express or implied, created by the 
contract, in the same manner as if he were the principal in interest.”). 
 68. E.g. Haas v. Harris, 347 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (“[W]hen 
the agent acts for a partially disclosed principal or on his own for an undisclosed 
principal, the agent is a party to the agreement and is liable on the contract.”) 
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 321, 322). 
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Applying this precedent to economic entities such as the 
taxicab company in Bagot will neither cause injustice nor work any 
practical hardship.  If the taxicab company had wished to avoid this 
type of responsibility, it merely needed to make clear to its 
customers that,  “We are just an intermediary and are not 
responsible for the quality of service.  Your contract will be with 
whatever cab driver shows up at your door.” 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Minnesota law has long recognized the agency law principle of 
apparent authority.  Minnesota law also provides that an agent is 
liable for the contractual obligations of an undisclosed or partially 
disclosed principal.  Both of these well-recognized principles 
provided a basis for the plaintiff’s suit in Bagot, and both ought to 
provide a basis for similar suits in the future. 
 
